Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association
v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James L. Harris Jr.; attorney for appellee.
Gregory J. Sanders, Patrick C. Burt, Kipp & Christian; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, No. 20090676 (Utah Court
of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1811

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND,
LEARNING ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

OPPOSITION
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
:
:
Case No. 20090676-SC

CAROLINA CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,

:

Defendant and Appellant.

Opposition to Brief of Appellant Carolina Casualty on Certiorari from the Utah
Court of Appeals Arising from an Appeal from a Judgment on the Pleadings,
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Judge Robert P. Faust

James L. Harris, Jr., USB # 8204
Attorney for Appellee EAGALA
556 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801)466-3133
Gregory J. Sanders
Patrick C. Burt
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant Carolina Casualty
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 466-3133

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE CO.
MAR f ^

CM*y

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND,
LEARNING ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

OPPOSITION
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
:
:
Case No. 20090676-SC

CAROLINA CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Opposition to Brief of Appellant Carolina Casualty on Certiorari from the Utah
Court of Appeals Arising from an Appeal from a Judgment on the Pleadings,
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Judge Robert P. Faust
James L. Harris, Jr., USB # 8204
Attorney for Appellee EAGALA
556 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 466-3133
Gregory J. Sanders
Patrick C. Burt
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant Carolina Casualty
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 466-3133

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The following is a complete list of the parties in the proceedings before the Third
Judicial District Court:
JUDGE
The Hon. Robert P. Faust, Judge Presiding, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
Department.

PARTIES
1. Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association ("EAGALA"), plaintiff,
represented by Brian S. King and James L. Harris, Jr., Attorneys at Law. EAGALA is a
non-profit Utah corporation. Brian S. King is no longer counsel for EAGALA.
2. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, defendant, represented by Gregory J.
Sanders, and Patrick C. Burt, of Kipp and Christian, P.C.
3. Monitor Liability Managers, Inc., defendant, represented by Gregory J. Sanders,
and Patrick C. Burt, of Kipp and Christian, P.C. Monitory Liability was dismissed below
via stipulation of the parties and is not an appellee herein.

PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
This case was previously heard by the Utah Court of Appeals, and a decision
favorable to EAGALA was rendered by that court. Equine Assisted Growth and Learning
Association v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, 2009 UT App200, 216 P.3d 971.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

OPPOSITION BRIEF OF APPELLEE

1

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

7

I.

CAROLINA CASUALTY OWED EAGALA A DUTY TO DEFEND

7

A.
B.
C.

The Duty to Defend
EAGALA's Policy Provisions
The Allegations in Kersten's Complaint

7
9
10

II.

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT

11

A.
B.

Carolina Casualty must Follow the Terms of EAGALA's Policy
The Terms of a Particular Policy Determine Whether the Insurer must
Examine Extrinsic Evidence
The Specific Terms of EAGALA's Policy Require that Extrinsic Evidence Be
Examined as a Part of Carolina Casualty's Investigation of Claims Brought
Against the Insureds
Extrinsic Evidence Provides the Factual Basis to Enforce Carolina Casualty's
Duty to Defend EAGALA
The Cases of Green and Thatcher Are Distinguishable from the Facts at Bar . . .

11

C.

D.
E.
III.

THERKELSEN'S ANALYSIS DOES NOT NEED TO BE OVERRULED
NOR MODIFIED
ii

12

15
16
18

20

CONCLUSION

23

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

24

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

Allstate Indemnity Company v. Thatcher. 2007 UT App 183
Beck y. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)

12, 18, 19
19-20

Deseret Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n y. United States Fid. & Guar. Co..
714 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1986)

7

Farmers Insurance Exchange y. Versaw, 2004 UT 73
Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen. 2001 UT 48
Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenburg. 930 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
Green v. State Fire & Casualty Company. 2005 UT App 564
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America. 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983)
LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988)

8,21
1,7,11,12
14
7, 12, 19
8
21

Noya Casualty Co. v. Able Constr.. Inc.. 1999 UT 69

7

Phillips v. Utah Local Goy'ts Trust. 660 P.2d 249 (Utah 1983)

8

Rosas v. Evre. 2003 UT App 414

14, 15

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dey. Corp.. 720 So. 2d 1072 (Fla 1998)
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt.
854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993)
Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. Of America. 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1955)

iv

14

8, 21
8

MISCELLANEOUS

Page

14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 200:18 (3rd ed. 1999)

7

Douglas R. Richmond, 35 San Diego L Rev. 457, 549 (1998)

13

UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Page

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5)(1953 as amended)

v

1

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND,
LEARNING ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPPOSITION
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
:

vs.
CaseNo.20090676-SC
CAROLINA CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND LEARNING ASSOCIATION
("EAGALA"), by and through counsel, submits the following opposition to Carolina
Casualty Insurance Company's ("Carolina Casualty") opening brief:
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction having granted Appellant's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, on November 23, 2009. See Utah Code Ann. ^ 78A-3-102(5).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue as stated by the grant of certiorari is u Whether the Court of Appeals
erred in holding the District Court improperly refused to consider extrinsic evidence in
granting [Carolina Casualty's] motion for summary judgment."
Carolina Casualty, however, also asks this Court to overrule Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 47, an issue raised for the first time in front
of this Court. As discussed more fully below, that issue should be denied.

The issues raised by EAGALA before the Court of Appeals were as follows:
1) Whether an insurer has a duty to defend is generally found by comparing the
allegation of the complaint to the terms of the policy. Kersten's Complaint, ostensibly
brought in EAGALA's name, asserts claims of wrongdoing done both to EAGALA and
Kersten individually. Given Kersten's individual claims, did Carolina Casualty properly
deny a defense to the Complaint?
2) When insurance coverage disputes arise and the insurance policy requires the
insurer to investigate whether a claim is valid, Utah case law requires a court to review
extrinsic evidence to decide if a duty to defend exists. EAGALA's insurance policy
requires Carolina Casually to cover expenses associated with the investigation of claims
brought against EAGALA's trustees and directors. Was the trial court's refusal to
consider extrinsic evidence proper in this case?
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case is a breach of contract case, where the insurer chose to ignore the facts
and blindly adhere to an exclusion to deny coverage. Carolina Casualty's statement of the
facts is incomplete. EAGALA presents a more complete statement of the facts of this
case:
1. Greg Kersten resigned as CEO of EAGALA and as an EAGALA trustee on
March 23, 2005. R. 123 (Thomas Aff, at U 5). He remained a paid employee of
EAGALA. R. 123 (Thomas Aff., at Tj 6).
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2. After discovering some questionable business practices, the Board of Trustees
for EAGALA terminated Greg Kersten's employment on November 16, 2005. R. 2
(Complaint U 8); R. 123 (Thomas Aff, % 7).
3. Greg Kersten initiated legal action on 11/17/2005, captioned EAGALA v.
Thomas, et al.. Case No. 050403512, Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County,
State of Utah ("Kersten's Complaint"). R. 2 (Complaint, ^ 9); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., H 8).
4. Although it was styled as an action on behalf of EAGALA, Kersten's
Complaint was, in fact, a complaint of wrongful termination and the airing of other claims
against EAGALA. R. 3 (Complaint, ^ 10); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ^ 10).
5. Kersten filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") on the same
day he filed his complaint. R. 3 (Complaint, ^ 11); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ^ 11).1
6. Kersten had no authority to bring an action in the name of EAGALA. R. 3
(Complaint, f 12). The action was improperly brought in the name of EAGALA. R. 123
to 124 (Thomas Aff., ^j 12, Tf 13, and«[[ 19). Kersten was no longer an EAGALA trustee
nor an employee, having been terminated. R. 123-4 (Thomas Aff., ^j 5, % 7 & ]fl2).
7. The Defendants in Kersten's Complaint were the members of the EAGALA
Board of Trustees. R. 3 (Complaint, ^ 13); R. 124 (Thomas Aff., If 14).
1

Carolina Casualty finds "of significance" the "fact" that the Fourth District
Court issued a temporary restraining order "preserving Kersten as corporate officer ...."
Brief of Appellant, p. 6. That order was issued ex parte, and was dissolved just as soon
as the Fourth District Court could schedule an adversarial hearing and was made aware of
the fact that Kersten had no authority to act in the name of EAGALA. R. 3 (Complaint, ^j
15).
3

8. The Defendants in Kersten's Complaint were individual insureds under
EAGALA's insurance policy with Carolina Casualty. R. 3 (Policy at p. 7).
9. Kersten was granted a TRO allowing him to obtain temporary7 control over
EAGALA property and assets. R. 3 (Complaint, ^ 14); R. 124 (Thomas Aff, ^ 15).
10. Within a week, EAGALA presented the court with facts showing that Kersten
was no longer affiliated with EAGALA. The TRO was dissolved on November 23, 2005.
R. 3 (Complaint, 115); R. 124 (Thomas Aff, ^ 16- ^ 17).
11. In an Order dated 11/16/2005, the Court found that Kersten's Complaint was
improperly brought in the name of EAGALA. R. 124 (Thomas Aff, If 18).
12. After his first legal action was dismissed, Kersten brought a second lawsuit
against EAGALA properly styled as a wrongful termination. Carolina Casualty is
providing a defense at their expense pursuant to the policy. R. 124 (Thomas Aff., % 20).
13. EAGALA purchased non-profit organization liability insurance from Carolina
Casualty Insurance Company. R. 124 (Thomas Aff, ^ 19).
14. The Policy provides coverage for "Costs of Defense" defined as:
[Reasonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ....
R. 160 (Policy, p. l)(emphasis in original).
15. A "claim" is defined in the policy as:
Claim(s) means a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief
including, but not limited to, a civil criminal, administrative or arbitration

proceeding; provided, however, that the term Claim shall not include labor or
grievance arbitration subject to a collective bargaining agreement. A Claim
shall be deemed to have been first made at the time notice of the Claim is
first received by any Insured.
R. 160 (Policy, p. 1 (emphasis in original)).
16. The policy covers a "Loss" arising from a Claim made against the individual
insureds, and costs of a defense. R. 161. "Loss" also includes coverage for "Wrongful
Act" and "Wrongful Employment Acts" as defined under the policy. R. 161-162. The
allegations in Kersten's Complaint fall under the definition of "Wrongful Employment
Acts" as defined in the policy. R. 131-135 (Kersten's Complaint,ffif23-25, 28-29, 32-33,
37-38, & 40).
18. The policy also states:
THIS POLICY PROVIDES COVERAGE ON A CLAIMS MADE AND
REPORTED BASIS SUBJECT TO ITS TERMS. THIS POLICY APPLIES ON
TO ANY "CLAIM" FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSUREDS AND
REPORTED TO THE INSURER DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, THE
AUTOMATIC EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD, OR THE PURCHASED
EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD.
R. 153 (Policy, Declarations Page ("all caps" in original)).
19. The policy contains the following exclusion:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection
with any Claim made against an Insured:
[]

by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity; provided,
however, this exclusion does not apply to any Claim that is a
derivative action brought or maintained on behalf of the Insured
Entity, but only if such Claim is instigated and continued totally
independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance
5

of, or active participation of, or intervention of any Individual
Insured or the Insured Entity.
R. 163 (Policy, p. 4).
20. Carolina Casualty's claims administrator denied coverage claiming that the
complaint was brought "by, on behalf of, or in the right o f EAGALA and applied the
exclusion to deny coverage. R. 43.
21. Carolina Casualty is currently providing a defense at their expense pursuant to
the policy to a second lawsuit filed by Kersten. R. 124 (Thomas Aff., ^j 20).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A comparison of allegations in Kersten's Complaint, to the coverage terms of the
policy, show that Carolina Casualty owed EAGALA a duty to defend. In the alternative,
EAGALA's policy required that Carolina Casualty examine extrinsic evidence in
determining its duty to defend. That evidence would have shown that Kersten's
Complaint was improperly excluded under an "insured entity versus insured" prohibition.
Kersten's Complaint was not properly brought in EAGALA's name, but asserted claims
by Kersten as an employee or former employee of EAGALA for wrongful termination.
Finally, the exclusion relied upon by Carolina Casualty is ambiguous. Any ambiguity or
uncertainty in the language of EAGALA's policy must be resolved in favor of coverage.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

CAROLINA CASUALTY OWED EAGALA A DUTY TO DEFEND.
A. The Duty to Defend.
In general, the duty to defend is a contractual construction, arising out of the

insurance policy. This Court has instructed, "'As a general rule, an insurer's duty to
defend is determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy, with the
allegations in the complaint.'" Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT
48 at U 21, 27 P.3d 555 (quoting, 14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on
Insurance § 200:18 (3rd ed. 1999)). However, that is not the end of the inquiry. The "duty
to defend exists 'when those allegations, if proved, could result in liability."' Nova
Casualty Co. v. Able Constr.. Inc.. 1999 UT 69, % 6, 983 P.2d 575 (Utah 1999); Green v.
State Fire & Casualty Company. 2005 UT App 564, ^ 19, 127 P.3d 1279. The "duty to
defend is measured by the nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy and arises
whenever the insurer ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the
policy." Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.. 714 P.2d
1143, 1146 (Utah 1986).
Herein, Carolina Casualty failed to compare the coverage provisions of the policy
with the allegations in the underlying complaint. Rather, Carolina Casualty applied a very
simplistic approach by merely looked at the parties in the underlying complaint, and
applied the exclusion that the complaint was brought "by, on behalf of, or in the right o f
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EAGALA. In reality, the complaint simply was not brought on behalf of EAGALA by
anyone with authority to do so. As a result, EAGALA asked very early in this process
that Carolina Casualty examine extrinsic evidence to that effect, examine the allegations
of Kersten's Complaint, and defend the covered claims therein.
Utah law clearly establishes that insurance contracts are interpreted in favor of the
insured.
Although we construe insurance contracts using the same interpretive tolls
we use to review contracts generally, we have frequently declared that
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, they are to be "construe
liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and
not defeat the purposes of insurance."
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ^ 24, 99 P.3d 769 {citing United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). Coverage
provisions are to be read broadly, and exclusionary provisions are to be read narrowly
against the insurer. Sandt., 854 P.2d at 524 ("an insurer must use explicit language if it
intends to limit coverage by an exclusion"); see also Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. Of
America. 50 F.3d 793, 799-800 (10th Cir. 1955)(words of inclusion are liberally construed
in favor of the insured whereas words of exclusion strictly construed against the insurer);
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America. 669 P.2d 410, 417 (Utah 1983)(applying rule
that ambiguities be resolved against drafter in construing insurance contract); Phillips v.
Utah Local Gov'ts Trust. 660 P.2d 249, 250 (Utah 1983)(same). Because Carolina

8

Casualty relies upon an exclusion to deny coverage, the provision should be construed
narrolwy, and the burden is upon Carolina Casualty to prove that the exclusion applies.
B. EAGALA's Policy Provisions.
The policy herein indicates that Carolina Casualty will provide a defense against
claims made against the insureds. A "claim" is defined in the policy as:
Claim(s) means a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief including,
but not limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitration proceeding;
provided, however, that the term Claim shall not include labor or grievance
arbitration subject to a collective bargaining agreement. A Claim shall be deemed
to have been first made at the time notice of the Claim is first received by any
Insured.
R. 160 (Policy, p. 1 (emphasis in original)). The policy covers a "Loss" arising from a
Claim made against the individual insureds, and costs of a defense. R. 161. "Loss" also
includes coverage for "Wrongful Act" and "Wrongful Employment Acts" as defined
under the policy. R. 161-162. The allegations in Kersten's Complaint fall under the
definition of "Wrongful Employment Acts" as defined in the policy. R. 131-135
(Kersten's Complaint,fflf23-25, 28-29, 32-33, 37-38, & 40). Finally, the Policy provides
coverage for "Costs of Defense" defined as:
[Reasonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ... .
R. 160 (Policy, p. l)(emphasis in original).
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C. The Allegations in Kersten's Complaint.
A review of Kersten's Complaint reveals, inter alia, the following allegations
against the defendants in that case (the insured Board of Trustees):
•Providing "false and/or misleading information regarding" Kersten. R. 131
(Kersten's Complaint, ^ 23);
•Trying to undermine Kersten. R. 131 (Kersten's Complaint, f 24);
•Interfering with Kersten's duties. R. 131 (Kersten's Complaint, *[[ 25);
•Removal of Kersten as President and CEO. R. 132 (Kersten's Complaint, ^f
28);
•Interference with Kersten's access to EAGALA's money and equipment. R.
132 (Kersten's Complaint, ^ 29);
•Providing false and misleading information regarding Kersten. R. 133
(Kersten's Complaint Tf 32);
•Depriving Kersten of control of business assets and resources. R. 133
(Kersten's Complaint, 133);
•Damage to Kersten's reputation and business relations. R. 134 (Kersten's
Complaint,fflf37 & 38); and,
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•Wrongful interference with Kersten's employment. R. 135 (Kersten's
Complaint, (Kersten's Complaint, ^ 40).2
These claims are all clearly covered by the policy, and Carolina Casualty
owed a duty to defend the insureds against these allegations. Carolina Casualty
cannot simply ignore the allegations of the underlying complaint and focus only on
the purported parties to the lawsuit. There was no dispute that Kersten had no
authority to bring a lawsuit in the name of EAGALA. As a result, Carolina Casualty
was required to look at the specific allegations in the complaint to see if those
allegations were covered under the terms of the policy.
II.

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT.
A.

Carolina Casualty must Follow the Terms of EAGALA9s Policy.

Carolina Casualty asserts that "the Utah Court of Appeals . . . applied an
'actuality' analysis it derived from Therkelsen to say that the insurer here had a duty
to examine extrinsic facts before denying a defense." Brief of Appellant, p. 11.
Carolina Casualty's argument, culled down to the bare bones, is that Therkelsen's
principles are "not pragmatic in the real work of insurance ... ." Brief of Appellant,
p. 12. This process is not about what might be the easiest way for Carolina Casualty
to process claims, but rather about forcing Carolina Casualty to follow the terms of
2

Kersten refers to himself throughout his complaint as "EAGALA's Director,
President and CEO." He also references himself as a board member, and indeed
chairman of the board of trustees. However, the undisputed facts establish that Kersten
resigned as a trustee and had been terminated as an employee.
11

this particular policy. The Appellate Court's decision does not change the insurance
claims procedure. Rather, it simply reinforces that Therkelsen applies to
EAGALA's particular policy and particular situation.
Carolina Casually asserts that it only need look at two documents, Kersten's
Complaint and, the policy. To support that proposition, Carolina Casualty cited
Allstate Indemnity Company v. Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183, 164 P.3d 445 (Ut. App.
2007), Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, and, Green v. State Fire & Casualty Company,
supra. Thatcher and Green are distinguishable. Therkelsen, on the other hand,
directly applies.
B.

The Terms of a Particular Policy Determine Whether the Insurer
must Examine Extrinsic Evidence.

Carolina Casualty argues that the "Court of Appeals took dicta from Fire
Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen and converted it into hard law that
cannot be applied to the facts of this case." Brief of Appellant, p. 6. Carolina
Casualty is wrong.
As noted above, the Appellate Court's ruling does not change the paradigm
for insurers to examine claims. Rather, the Appellate Court's decision merely
enforces interpretation of certain insurance contracts, using the guidelines already
articulated by this Court in Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48.
Under Therkelsen, this Court made clear that extrinsic evidence is allowed to
show a duty to defend in certain situations. Therkelsen involved a domestic dispute
12

where a husband shot his wife, her paramour and then himself. 2001 UT 48 atfflf67. The paramour survived and sued the husband's estate for damages. Id. at *f 9.
Ironically, in Therkelsen, it was the insurer who sought to introduce extrinsic
evidence in an attempt to terminate its duty to defend. The insurer initially defended
the claim, but after obtaining certain evidence, sought summary judgment that it had
no duty to indemnify nor defend. Id. at ^f 10.3
This Court stated
whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether an insurer
has a duty to defend an insured turns on the parties' contractual terms. If
the parties make the duty to defend dependent on the allegations against the
insured, extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to a determination of whether a duty
to defend exists. However, if, for example, the parties make the duty to
defend dependent on whether there is actually a "covered claim or suit,"
extrinsic evidence would be relevant to a determination of whether a duty to
defend exists.
14 at 1| 25.
In analyzing the duty to defend this Court instructed as follows:
[H]omeowners policies commonly create "a contractual duty [of an insurer]
to defend its insured against lawsuits by third-parties alleging liability
within the coverage afforded by the policy. The liability coverage in a
standard homeowners policy provides that the insurer will 'provide a
defense at [the insurer's] expense by counsel of [the insurer's] choice, even
if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.'" Douglas R. Richmond, 35
San Diego L Rev. 457, 549 (1998). In such a case, "The duty to indemnify
[would be] determined by the underlying facts of the case, [while] the duty
3

The language of the policy in Therkelsen stated that the insurer "would pay those
damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or
property damages resulting from an occurrence to which this coverage applies." Id. at Tf
8.
13

to defend [would be] controlled by the allegations in the complaint against
the insured." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d
1072, 1077 n.3 (Fla 1998). ...Under such a policy, a determination of the
duty to defend based on the allegations in the complaint, pursuant to the
majority rule, accurately reflects the terms of the parties' contractual
agreement. Indeed, in such a case it would be error for the trial court to
consider extrinsic evidence, as it is wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether
the insurer has a duty to defend its insured.
On the other hand, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930
P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals had before it an
insurance policy that described the duty to defend as follows: "At our
expense and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured against
any covered claim or suit." Id. at 1203. In such a case, it would be
appropriate for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence, other wise it
would be unable to determine whether the claim or suit was "covered" by
the policy.
Id. atfflj23-24 (emphasis in original; internal footnotes omitted).4
Therkelsen was subsequently applied by the Utah Court of Appeals in Rosas v.
Eyre, 2003 UT App 414, 82 P.3d 185 (Ut. App. 2003). The first task in deciding whether
there is a duty to defend is determining "whether [the] policy made the duty to depend on
the allegations in the complaint or on extrinsic evidence." Rosas, at TJ 21. The Rosas
Court offered the following:
[A]s an example of a policy where extrinsic evidence could be considered
in determining whether a duty to defend existed, the [Therkelsen] court
cited to "an insurance policy that described the duty to defend as follows:
'At our expense and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured
against any covered claim or suit.'"

4

Because it did not have the necessary policy provisions, the Court remanded the
case to determine whether the insurer "had a duty to defend the estate based on the actual
contractual terms of [the] policy." Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48 at U 26.
14

Rosas, at ^f 22 (emphasis in original).
C.

The Specific Terms of EAGALA's Policy Require that Extrinsic
Evidence Be Examined as a Part of Carolina Casualty's Investigation
of Claims Brought Against the Insureds.

The language of EAGALA's policy is not restricted to solely what the complaint
sought to recover and its basis for recovery. Rather, the policy is drafted in such a
manner that this Court must examine extrinsic evidence to "determine whether the claim
or suit was 'covered' by the policy." Therkelsen, 2001 UT App 48 at TJ 24.
EAGALA's policy is very similar to the example set forth above in Rosa.
EAGALA's policy explicitly covers insureds for claims made under the policy. Indeed,
the Policy places a duty upon Carolina Casualty to provide
[Reasonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ....
Policy, p. 1 (emphasis in original). Claims in the policy are defined as "a written demand
for monetary or non-monetary relief, including, but no limited to, a civil, criminal,
administrative or arbitration proceeding ...." Carolina Casualty had no ability to
determine whether the "insured entity versus insured" exclusion applies until and unless it
investigates the underlying claim brought against the insureds. Furthermore, use of the
word "investigation'" implies more than merely ignoring information provided by the
insured to the insurer. This is a first party insurance contract where EAGALA purchased
a policy to specifically cover these types of situations. This is not a third party claim

15

where the claimant and the insurer are adversarial. The language of the policy confirms
that in suggesting that Carolina Casualty should at the very least have investigated
whether or not a duty to defend existed.
Finally, this was not a case where the issue was undecided for a lengthy period of
time. EAGALA knew in a very short period of time that the claimed exclusion did not
apply. Carolina Casualty likewise had this information very early in the underlying
action. Indeed, Carolina Casualty knew almost immediately that this was not a case
where the "insured entity" had sued the insureds. Carolina Casualty knew almost
immediately that the claimed exclusion did not apply. It choose, however, to simply
ignore these facts and blindly adhere to its claimed exclusion.
D.

Extrinsic Evidence Provides the Factual Basis to Enforce Carolina
Casualty's Duty to Defend EAGALA.

It is important to identify the actual exclusion applied. Carolina Casualty
references the exclusion as an "insured versus insured" exclusion. However, the
exclusion is actually much narrower "insured entity versus insured" exclusion. Carolina
Casualty can only apply the exclusion if the "insured entity", in this case EAGALA, has
actually brought the lawsuit. Kersten had no authority to bring a claim in the name of the
insured entity, EAGALA, a fact that Carolina Casualty wishes to ignore.
Had Carolina Casualty not ignored the proffered evidence, it would have had to
acknowledge that Greg Kersten had no authority or right to bring a lawsuit in the name of
EAGALA. R. 2, 3, & 5 (Complaint,ffi[8, 12, 15 & 21); R. 123-134 (Thomas Aff., ffl[ 1216

13, 17 & 19). Kersten had resigned his position as a board trustee, and had been
terminated as an employee. Thomas Aff, ^ 5-7. He was a former employee with an axe
to grind. Thus, the lawsuit was brought by terminated employee who had a grievance
against the organization, and who used the litigation to seek redress of those grievances,
including wrongful termination and other personal injury claims. The Fourth District
Court in Kersten's original matter immediately recognized that the legal action was
improperly brought in EAGALA's name, and ultimately dismissed that action. R. 3
(Complaint, ^ 15); R. 124 (Thomas Aff, «f 19).
Carolina Casualty indicates that EAGALA has "an incurable problem [in that]
Kersten was always an individual insured under the definition including former officers
and the Kersten's Complaint was resolved by a voluntary dismissal with a motion
pending." Brief of Appellant, p. 17. Carolina Casualty further asserts that "there is no
reasonable suggestion on the record this would have been a covered claim." Brief of
Appellee, p. 17. Carolina Casualty seems to indicate that because Kersten was a former
officer of EAGALA, he cannot bring a lawsuit against EAGALA for unlawful
termination. That is simply not true.
To be sure, Greg Kersten was a former corporate officer. However, under the
policy, and even as a former corporate officer, Kersten can bring a lawsuit against
EAGALA for wrongful termination. Such a claim is not prohibited by the "insured entity
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versus insured" exclusion. Indeed, one of the unchallenged facts5 herein is that after
Kersten's first legal action was dismissed, Kersten brought a second lawsuit against
EAGALA, properly styled as a wrongful termination, and properly in his name alone.
Carolina Casualty has and continues to provide a defense at its expense pursuant to the
policy to this second lawsuit. R. 124 (Thomas Aff, If 20). As a result, there is not only a
reasonable suggestion on the record, but uncontroverted evidence, that this claim would
have been a covered claim.
E.

The Cases of Green and Thatcher Are Distinguishable from the Facts
at Bar.

Carolina Casualty seized upon policy language in Green and Thatcher (similar
language is quoted in Therkelsen) to try to evade its duty to defend. Carolina Casualty
claims, "even if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, the court
must examine only what is sought to recover and its bases for recovery." Brief of
Appellant, p. 8. That is not entirely accurate.
In Thatcher, the policy read
Allstate will pay damages which an insured person become legally
obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage" arising from
an occurrence, which the Policy defines as "an accident." The Policy
further states that "[i]f an insured person is sued for these damages, we will
provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are
groundless, false or fraudulent.

5

Carolina Casualty admits that "[t]here have been no disputed material facts in
this litigation." Brief of Appellant, p. 7.
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Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183 at % 3.6 Similarly, the policy in Green reads:
[State Farm] will have the right and duty to defend any claim on suit
seeking damages payable under this policy even though the allegations of
the suit may be groundless, false or fraudulent.
Green 2005 UT App at ^ 17. In Green, the Appellate Court had to determine if the
underlying litigation "sought damages payable under [the policy] even thought the
allegation of the suit may be groundless, false or fraudulent." Id. Based upon that
language, and presumably pursuant to Therkelsen, the Appellate Court refused to examine
any extrinsic evidence, regarding the underlying litigation, and examined "only what [the
complaint] sought to recover and its basis for recovery." Id. at^j 19.
In contrast, EAGALA's policy contains additional, different language that,
according to Therkelsen, requires the examination of extrinsic evidence as part of
Carolina Casualty's investigation of the claims. EAGALA's policy, as set forth above, is
a "claims made" type of policy. Carolina Casualty had the obligation to investigate
claims made against the insureds. It retains that duty not just when trying to avoid third
party's claims against its insureds. As part of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inherent in every first party insurance contract, Beck v. Farmers Insurance

6

This language would presumably prohibit extrinsic evidence. See Therkelsen,
2001 UT 48 at If 23 However, Thatcher does not provide any meaningful analysis
because the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thatcher, 164 P.3d at 446.
Indeed, the underlying trespass complaint had been dismissed. As a result, the Court of
Appeals stated, "Because there is no complaint to analyze, we cannot determine whether
Allstate has a duty to defend." Id
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Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798-802 (Utah 1985), that duty exists in investigation whether
the "insured entity versus insured" exclusion applies.
Extrinsic evidence, as set forth above, would have proven that the underlying
lawsuit was improperly brought "by, on behalf of, or in the right o f EAGALA by a
terminated employee, who had no authority to do so. The exclusion, when read in light of
extrinsic evidence, simply does not apply.
III.

THERKELSEN's ANALYSIS DOES NOT NEED TO BE OVERRULED
NOR MODIFIED.
Carolina Casualty asks this court to either modify or overrule Therkelsen. This is

an issue raised for the first time on appeal, and as such should be denied. Furthermore,
Carolina Casualty's current position is a marked change from its position below. At the
Court of Appeals, Carolina Casualty cited Therkelsen to stand for the following
proposition: "Because insurance policies and their exclusion are treated as contracts,
without ambiguity extrinsic evidence becomes irrelevant." Brief of Appellee, p. 10
EAGALA v. Carolina Casualty, In the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 20080277. At no
time did Carolina Casualty indicate that these principles were drawn from dicta or that
Therkelsen should be overruled or modified.
Now, Carolina Casualty asserts that Therkelsen's analysis might be preserved only
"where there was some ambiguity in the policy language or some other special
circumstances where the eight corners rule would not work." Brief of Appellant, p. 19.
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However, Carolina Casualty asserts that the case at bar "presents no ambiguity or special
circumstances . . . . " Id.
Carolina Casualty is wrong. The exclusion relied upon to deny coverage is indeed
ambiguous, and therefore should be construed in favor of coverage. Ambiguity in
insurance contracts are interpreted in favor of the insured.
Although we construe insurance contracts using the same interpretive tools
we use to review contracts generally, we have frequently declared that
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, they are to be
"construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance."
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ^ 24, 99 P.3d 796 {citing United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993)).
Ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of
coverage . . . if an insurance contract has inconsistent provisions, one which
can be construed against coverage and one which can be construed in favor
of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage.[].
The reason for doing so is clear: "Because insurance policies are intended
for sale to the public, the language in the insurance contract must be
interpreted and construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would
understand it."
Versaw, 2004 UT 73 at 1f 25 {citing Sandt. 854 P.2d at 522-523); see also, LPS Hosp. v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) ("any ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage . . . since the
policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are construed against that party.").

21

As set forth above, Carolina Casualty invoked the following "insured entity versus
insured" exclusion:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection
with any Claim made against an Insured:
[]

by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity; provided,
however, this exclusion does not apply to any Claim that is a
derivative action brought or maintained on behalf of the Insured
Entity, but only if such Claim is instigated and continued totally
independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance
of, or active participation of, or intervention of any Individual
Insured or the Insured Entity.

R. 163.
The language of the exclusion "by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured
Entity" is ambiguous. First, there is no definition in the policy of what the language "by,
on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity" means. Second, there is no definition in
the policy regarding the "who" in relation to the exclusion. A very broad reading of the
exclusion would mean literally anyone, with no affiliation whatsoever to EAGALA, could
bring a claim purportedly on its behalf, and meet the terms exclusion. A "one- time"
donor of $5.00 to the organization could bring a claim on behalf of EAGALA and meet
the terms of the exclusion. A more rational reading of the language would be that the
exclusion narrowly applies only to those who actually have the authority and right to
bring an action by, on behalf of, or in the right of EAGALA. However, the language is
simply not defined, and therefore ambiguous. The ambiguity must be resolved in favor of
EAGALA, and construed in favor of coverage. Versaw, supra.
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The exclusion must be read in a way that Kersten, as a terminated employee, with
no current affiliation to EAGALA, had no authority or right to bring an action on behalf
of EAGALA. Thus, the exclusion should not apply, and coverage should extend.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the allegations in Kersten's Complaint, to the terms of the
policy, show that Carolina Casualty had a clear duty to defend. In the alternative,
EAGALA's policy mandates that Carolina Casualty examine extrinsic evidence in
determining its duty to defend. That evidence would have shown that the underlying
complaint was one for wrongful termination, and thus covered under the policy. Finally,
the exclusion relied upon by Carolina Casualty is ambiguous. Any ambiguity or
uncertainty in the language of EAGALA's policy must be resolved in favor of coverage.

WHEREFORE, this Court should uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals and
remand this matter with a mandate that Carolina Casualty owes EAGALA a duty to
defend the action brought by Kersten, and that Carolina Casualty must reimburse
EAGALA for the expenses incurred in defending the Kersten's Complaint.
Dated this 18th day of MARCH 2010.

By

u

JAMES L. HARRIS, J
Attorney for EAGALA
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